Evidentiality 2.0
Integrating egophoricity, focusing on equipollent contrasts, and re-examining visual evidentials

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“Evidentiality in Time and Space”
**Program**

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The grammaticalization of verbs of perception into direct evidentials: Setting the record straight
Henrik BERGQVIST & Karolina GRZECH
Stockholm University & University of Valencia

The semantic core of grammaticalized evidentials has been argued to consist of the speaker’s “source of information” for a proposition (Aikhenvald 2014). This definition targets the speaker’s sensory and cognitive access to events and has become a reference point for analyses of evidential forms. In this talk, we discuss direct evidentials, which purportedly signal the speaker’s unmitigated sensory access to an event, and argue that some persistent claims regarding the grammaticalization of direct evidentials from verbs of perception are misconceived. Instead of encoding the speaker’s sensory access to an event, direct evidentials encode the speaker’s epistemic authority over an event. We find support for our argument in the literature on how evidentials grammaticalize and the contextualized use of evidentials.

Matlock (1989) claims that direct evidentials originate with perception verbs and that they result from the metaphor knowing is seeing. Aikhenvald (2018) echoes this claim. However, the diachronic origin of direct evidentials with verbs of perception is typologically rare and the metaphorical transfer suggested by Matlock (1989) does not support an analysis of direct evidentials as encoding the speaker’s direct sensory access. By definition, lexico-semantic content (e.g. seeing) gives way to functional meaning (an evidential value) as part of the process of grammaticalization (e.g. Bybee et al. 1994). The lexical meaning of a perception verb is therefore not expected to be semantically preserved in the grammaticalization of direct evidentials. Thus, ‘seeing’ cannot be what grammaticalized direct evidentials mean, because this mode of (sensory) access constitutes the source domain and not the target domain in this suggested metaphorical transfer. The target domain is knowing, not seeing. This means that an evidential that has developed from a verb for seeing, as the result of a metaphorical transfer, by definition cannot denote visual access to an event. If this was the case, no metaphorical transfer would have taken place and the grammaticalization of the form in question would have produced no change in meaning. Such a scenario runs counter to what we expect from the grammaticalization process and what we know about metaphors. In this paper, we argue that direct evidentials – rather than encoding visual access to events – signal the speaker’s epistemic authority. We also show that epistemic authority – unlike visual access – may be metaphorically connected to seeing and knowing as source domain concepts.

We find additional support for our claim that direct evidentials encode the speaker’s epistemic authority in Barnes’ (1984) account of direct evidentials in Tuyuca. The “visual evidential”, -wi can also be used with propositions denoting the speaker’s own actions, as well as verified facts that the speaker can vouch for, and which are within the realm of the speaker’s experience (Barnes 1984: 259). If we take these uses at face value, we can only conclude that the meaning of -wi is impossible to define in terms of direct sensory access alone, in contradiction to Barnes’ (1984) proposal. Similar discrepancies between proposed definitions and the use of evidential forms are common place in descriptions of evidentials. However, such discrepancies have mostly been placed at the periphery of analysis. We think this is a serious analytical flaw.

Direct evidentials target the speaker’s direct perception, the speaker’s own actions, and the speaker’s integrated knowledge of verified facts (cf. Curnow 2003; Sun 2018). From an epistemic point of view, these different kinds of access fall under the speaker’s epistemic authority (cf. Kamio 1997). If we are willing to let go of the preconceived definition of evidentials as encoding information source and expand our analyses of direct evidentials to include claims of knowledge based on other parameters than the speaker’s sensory access, we may rid our analyses of discrepancies such as the one observed for Tuyuca.
References
Evidentials in Tsezic and beyond
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The system of evidentiality in the Tsezic languages (which belong to the Nakh-Daghestanian languages) shows the contrast between witnessed and unwitnessed events expressed only in the past tense (Forker 2018; Khalilova 2011). In the West Tsezic languages, there is an equipollent evidential contrast between Past witnessed and Past unwitnessed forms, as in (1). In the East Tsezic languages, the contrast is based on the distinction between a morphologically simple past tense, Preterite, and the Perfect, which is a compound tense based on the Perfective converb and the Present tense copula, as in (2).

(1) Khwarshi
a. obu-t’e-s obu c’ali:d-a žikʷa Ø-ejč-a
   father- OBL-GEN1 father(I) study- PTC.PST man(I) 1-be-PST.W
   ‘My father’s father was an educated man.’
b. hed hoboaža-ƛ’o mikʷa-ha b-eča-na χalq’i
   then now- SUP be.hungry- PRS HPL-be-PST.UNWIT people
   ‘At that time people were hungry.’

(2) Bezhta
a. kaʁaj j-oⁿq’o-jo
   letter(IV) IV-come-PST
   ‘The letter arrived.’ (the speaker saw this)
b. kaʁaj j-oⁿq’o-na gej
   letter(IV) IV-come-PF.CVB be.PRS
   ‘The letter has arrived.’ (the speaker did not see this)

The witnessed/unwitnessed contrast is based on a visual and non-visual source of information (additionally, auditory perception may also be marked with witnessed forms).

In addition to these basic functions, the opposition of witnessed and unwitnessed forms has extended uses, first mentioned in Comrie & Polinsky for Tsez [2007:344]: “<…> the contrast is used to report direct/indirect access to emotions, sensations, or beliefs. In this usage, Past Witnessed is normally associated with first person, because it is the speaker who has direct access to his/her own feelings or knowledge. Past Unwitnessed is used otherwise. The second usage <…> is functionally similar to that of the historic present”. This usage is found in narratives, where Past witnessed regularly refers to events, which the narrator did not witness.

The paper will discuss main and extended uses of evidentials in the Tsezic languages as well as in some other Daghestanian languages.

Abbreviations

References
Egophoric and evidential marking in Jejuan

KIM Soung-U
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(1) First-hand, sensory evidential (fieldwork data)

[jɒŋʰiıkə teɪlimpʰk teɪteɷ(-msʰ)-ɷ-la]  Yeongheui: NOM rice_cake fry-PROG-EV-DECL

‘[I saw] Yeongheui frying rice cake.’

(2) Inferential (from Yang et al. 2020: 151, analysis and glossing mine)

[halipʰɭ miŋa oŋeui-sʰ-ɷ-la]  old_man tangerine gather-PST-EV-DECL

‘[looking at the full basket] It seemed to me the old man had picked some tangerines.’

(3) Inferential (from Hyun and Kang 2011: 297, analysis and glossing mine)


‘[I concluded that] That person could be very good at fishing.’

Note that -ɷ has the allomorph -ә, which is presumably due to the historic presence of vowel harmony, and that the -la allomorph has been suggested to stem from the evidential form of the copula i-, which was involved in the grammaticalisation of the -kʰ-irrealis suffix (see Kim J.-H. 2014: 186). By default (or when occurring with progressive aspect as in (1)), -ɷ indicates the reporting of first-hand, sensory information. With past tense (2) or irrealis suffixes (3), the interpretation shifts from direct evidential to inferential (Yang et al. 2020, Kim J.-H. 2014). A shift from the speaker’s information source to that of the addressee between declarative and interrogative utterances is commonly observed (-ɷ in (4)).

(4) Fieldwork data

[kɨ nal ɭa-sʰ-taŋ mak-i-kʰ-a-l-en]  ilimpʰo

that day come-PST-CVB eat-EP-EGO.PF-DECL-QUOT name:tag

tola-sʰ-ɷ-nia?

hang-PST-EV-Q.PLR

‘Did [the mosquito] leave a name tag saying ‘I came and ate your blood today’?’

Jejuan -no/-kʷa and -ti suffixes behave similarly to egophoric phenomena described in other languages (Floyd et al. 2018).

(5) Fieldwork data

[na (*ulɨ olepi) ni=n=ne teip-i o-kʰ-a-la.]  1SG (*my_oldest_brother) 2SG=ASSOC give-LENT:LOC 1DECL-2INT

1PL brother 2SG=ASSOC house-LOC come-EGO.PF-DECL

oa-sʰ-i-ni, ni=n ɷtɨ ɭk-n-ti?

come-PST-EP-CVB 2SG=TOP where go-PF-Q.CONT.EGO?

‘I (*my_younger_brother) arrived at yours, but where did you go?’

The suffixes -no/-kʷa show an imperfective-perfective aspectual opposition and can only be used in declarative utterances with speaker reference (5). -ti can only be used in second-person, interrogative utterances (5). Even though the suffixes -no/-kʷa and -ti together cover the canonically egophoric 1DECL-2INT contexts, it is not as yet sure whether they can be regarded as part of the same paradigm.
These suffixes cannot occur in any other context (as exemplified by the impossibility of a third-person form in (5)), unless achieved through perspective shift in quotative constructions (as in ex. (4)) above. Some speakers identify a sense of volition with -no/-kʷa suffixes. While this distribution is fairly rigid, some rare cases involving a high degree of affectedness of a speaker appear to override the canonical 1DECL reference of -no/-kʷa suffixes.

Jejuan egophoricity and evidentiality show interactions in three areas. The first is the morphological distribution of the -ә and -no/-kʷa suffixes in the same pre-final verb slot. Secondly, the -ә suffix normally does not refer to first-person subjects (as in (1)), yet such marking is preferred with verbs describing internal sensory experience such as physical pain or emotions (ex. (6) below; for some speakers, this does not preclude the use of -no/-kʷa suffixes per se), or when a speaker reports a realisation about themselves (cf. Song J.-M. 2005, H.-S. Lee 2015 for Korean).

(6) from Lee (1978: 90, adaptation and glossing mine)
ul-i-nan nun apʰ-a-la
cry-EV-CVB.RS eye hurt-EV-DECL
‘[I could feel that] my eyes hurt after crying.’

Thirdly, since by default -ә refers to non-speaker subjects and -no/-kʷa to speaker subjects, these suffixes can help to distinguish speech participants when quoting speech (except for the case of internal state predicates), a linguistic resource that is not available to Korean speakers in this context.

These interactions notwithstanding, evidential and egophoric marking in Jejuan differ in a number of respects: in questions, evidential -ә appears in the same pre-final verb slot as in declaratives (ex. (4)), but egophoric -ti appears verb-finally. The evidential suffix is combinable with other tense-aspect-mood suffixes, while egophoric expressions are more heterogeneous: -no/-kʷa show an inherent aspectual distinction, whereas -ti can be combined with the perfective/imperfective suffixes -n/-m. Furthermore, -no/-kʷa are identified by some speakers as having a volitional meaning component, whereas evidential marking has no volitional semantics.

Thus, adding to existing discussions such as Floyd et al. (2018: 53ff.), I show how evidentiality and egophoricity in Jejuan is manifested across several heterogeneous constructions which partially interact. At the same time, however, the interaction between evidentiality and egophoricity depends on individual constructions and is not consistent throughout the language, and it is not clear whether egophoric expressions indeed express evidential meaning at all times.

Abbreviations
1=first person, 2=second person, ASSOC=associative, CVB=converb, DECL=declarative, EGO=egophoric, EP=epenthetic, EV=evidential, (I)PF=(im)perfective, INT=interrogative, LOC=locative, NOM=nominative, RS=reason, PL=plural, PROG=progressive aspect, PST=past tense, Q.CONT=content question, Q.PLR=polar question, QUOT=quotative, SG=singular, TOP=topic

References
Kim, Jee-Hong. 2014. Jejubangeoneui Tongsa Gisulgwa Gineungjeong [A Description and Explication of Jejuan Syntax: analysing categories and functions within a basic clause]. Seoul: Kyungjin.


Languages of the Pomoan family, indigenous to Northern California, are known for their evidential systems. Most of the Pomoan distinctions are of types that tend to occur cross-linguistically; hearsay/quotative, inferential, and direct experience markers can be reconstructed for their common ancestor, Proto-Pomoan. Beyond these, however, the languages differ in their inventories of markers, or at least those languages with sufficient documentation to provide evidence of them. The family consists of seven mutually unintelligible languages: Eastern Pomo, Southeastern Pomo, Northeastern Pomo, Northern Pomo, Southern Pomo, Kashaya (Southwestern) Pomo, and Central Pomo. Subgrouping within the family is not firmly established, but it is generally agreed that at least the last three, Southern Pomo, Kashaya, and Central Pomo comprise a subgroup. Eastern and Southeastern are considered the most divergent.

Central Pomo has developed two markers that could be considered egophoric. The suffix -la indicates that the speaker has firsthand knowledge of the situation because s/he carried it out as an agent: Čhléy-la ‘(I/we) won’; Lóq’ʔul sq’at-la ‘(I/we) ripped up my old shirt (to make rags)’ The suffix -wiya indicates that the speaker was not in control but significantly affected: Ščéw-wiya ‘(I/we) got caught’; Mmála qaqóč-wiya ‘Fleas are biting (me/us)’. Neither is obligatory; each could be replaced with the direct evidence marker -ya or simply omitted. Neither is a pronoun: pronouns are independent words in Central Pomo which normally precede the verb and follow an agent/patient pattern, rather than accusative or ergative. Unlike the other evidentials, however, these two markers never co-occur with pronouns.

It is not possible to trace the diachronic development of the markers, but they appear to represent innovations within Central Pomo, since they are not documented in the other languages. (It should be noted that records of spontaneous conversation in the other languages are sparse.) There are, however, some faint clues to their histories. Kashaya, a close relative of Central Pomo, contains two markers not found in the other languages, which Oswalt (1961) lists as -(w)ela ‘imperfective performative’ and -mela ‘perfective performative’. These would appear to be related to the Central Pomo agent evidential -la, which occurs with both perfectives and imperfectives. (Central Pomo lost most vowels in initial syllables, often with erosion of the initial consonant.) The two more divergent members of the family, Eastern Pomo and Southeastern Pomo, which each constitute a separate branch, contain possible relatives of the Central Pomo patient evidential -wiya in their first person patient pronouns: Eastern wi and Southeastern wi-t. The second syllable ya of the Central Pomo -wiya could be the direct experience marker still found in all of the languages.

References
Authority over information as an unmarked value: 
Seeking the roots of “egophoricity” in Milang and other Macro-Tani languages
Yankee Modi & Mark W. Post
University of Sydney and Centre for Cultural-Linguistic Diversity

“Egophoricity” in Trans-Himalayan languages has become an increasingly vexed and vexing topic. Despite a proliferation of books and articles within the past several years (Gawne and Hill 2017, Floyd, Norcliffe et al. 2018, Bergqvist and Kittilä 2020, among many others), several of the most basic claims we would like to make regarding “egophoricity” seem to remain out of reach.

As was insightfully discussed by Widmer (2017, 2020), this seems at least partly due to cross-linguistic (or perhaps cross-branch, and/or cross-typological-profile) variation within the family. “Egophoricity” marking in Tibetic languages seems to be integrated into a broader system whose existential predicates also mark tense/aspect and evidentiality. Accordingly, authors such as Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) have proposed to subsume Tibetic “egophoricity” within a broader category “evidentiality” – a view that is at odds with standard approaches to evidentiality following Aikhenvald (2004, Aikhenvald and Dixon 2014). Other languages, such as Kathmandu Newar, Bunan and Galo, show at least some grammatical subsystems that have been described within the rubric of “egophoricity”, yet seem both structurally and to some extent also functionally different from Tibetic egophoricity/evidentiality systems. The question thus naturally arises as to whether or not we are talking about “the same thing”.

If there is a common core to “egophoricity” systems, it seems to have to do with “personal/privileged knowledge” – a representation that is made by a speaker that they have some sort of personal or otherwise privileged relationship to the information that is conveyed in a declarative utterance; or, in at least some systems, it can represent a speaker’s assumption that the addressee has this same relationship to the information conveyed by an interrogative utterance. Analyses differ as to whether additional parameters are necessarily involved, such as source of knowledge (e.g. from direct participation, or from personal/internal experience), degree of volition or control, etc., however the association of “egophoricity” systems with personal authority over information on the part of the speaker would appear to be constant.

In this presentation, we will discuss what we believe may be a related phenomenon in the Macro-Tani branch of Trans-Himalayan. In this account, we will argue that a Macro-Tani finite, inflected, declarative clause must always (unless it is marked otherwise) entail an assertion on the part of the speaker that they have authority over the information that the clause conveys. Although information could derive from a speaker’s personal experience, or could be a general fact about the world which is also known to others, it is in any case understood as information over which the speaker asserts their authority and right to speak about. Speaker authority over information, in this sense, constitutes the unmarked case in the organization of Macro-Tani grammars.

When a speaker does not wish to make such a representation – for example, when a speaker is representing knowledge they have obtained through hearsay, inference or deduction, or when a speaker wishes to ask a question or express some doubt – Macro-Tani languages offer a rich array of devices for modifying a clause, centred on two main strategies: marking the clause focus via one of a wide array of focus particles, and/or neutralization of clause finiteness through predicate nominalization. Such modified clauses can express a wide range of epistemic (including evidential), stance, and illocutionary force values, which are therefore all considered marked relative to the “authoritative” value. We will illustrate this phenomenon primarily by means of our field data from the Macro-Tani languages Milang, Adi, and Galo. We will also show how differently clauses may be structured – reflecting the principles discussed above – in face-to-face conversation, as compared with more formal contexts such as newspaper writing, public signage and translations of the Christian Bible. We will also discuss the possible source of authoritative force in Macro-Tani declarative clauses in terms of the origin of the Macro-Tani inflectional system in a set of Tibetic-like clause-final existential predicates.

Through this presentation, we hope to work toward an understanding of Trans-Himalayan languages as being structured in part through a pervasive concern for the relationships that obtain
between speech act participants and the information contents of speech, a concern that can manifest itself in fairly basic areas of the grammar, such as main declarative clauses in Macro-Tani languages, as well as perhaps in more highly specified, more restricted, and more often polysemous morphological categories such as the “egophoric/allophoric”-style oppositions found in Newar, Galo and Bunam, as well as in Tibetic copula/existential predicators. A great deal of work will still need to be done to determine how such more grammaticalized “egophoric” systems ultimately arise.

Examples (Modi 2017)

(1)  
  joon  bozar    yi-tu.  
  John  bozar(<Asm)  go-PFV  
  ‘John went to the market.’ (Milang) (speaker asserts authority over information)

(2)  
  joon  bozar    yi-tu-ɲ  bo  
  John  bozar(<Asm)  go-PFV-NZR:SUBJ  PQ.CLAR  
  ‘Did John go to the market?’ (Milang) (nominalization neutralises speaker authority, particle marks stance)

(3)  
  joon  bozar    yi-tu-ɲ  la  
  John  bozar(<Asm)  go-PFV-NZR:SUBJ  HSAY  
  ‘(I heard) John went to the market.’ (Milang) (nominalization neutralises speaker authority, particle marks stance)

Principal Macro-Tani inflections and their existential-predicator sources (Post 2006)

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<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source (PTani)</th>
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<tr>
<td>-duŋ</td>
<td>‘IPFV’</td>
<td>*duŋ</td>
<td>‘sit &gt; exist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-do(ŋ)</td>
<td>‘STAT’</td>
<td>*doŋ</td>
<td>‘lie down &gt; exist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-dak</td>
<td>‘COS’</td>
<td>*dak</td>
<td>‘stand &gt; exist’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-to</td>
<td>‘PFV’</td>
<td>*to</td>
<td>‘have/exist/be associated’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tuŋ</td>
<td>‘EXPR’</td>
<td>*tuŋ</td>
<td>‘???’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ka-i</td>
<td>‘PF’</td>
<td>*ka-i</td>
<td>‘have/exist-PCL’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ye</td>
<td>‘IRR’</td>
<td>*rjә</td>
<td>‘live/exist’</td>
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References


The puzzle of performative egophors
Patrick MUÑOZ
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Ü-Tsang / ‘Standard’ Tibetan egophors can occur in performative-like constructions (Austin 1962), whereby the evidential origo (the speaker, in indicative matrix clauses) apparently makes a proposition true by uttering it with egophoric marking, while an utterance of the same proposition with non-egophoric marking only relays a fact, as in (1)-(2).

(1)
‘This is your tea.’ ( […]I’m giving it to you.] / […]As a matter of fact.]
[adapted from Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 94]

(2)
‘Your name is Dorje Namgyal.’ ( […]I’m naming you.] / […]As a matter of fact.]
[adapted from Garrett 2001: 141, ex. 33]

Garret (2001: §4.2.3) holds that these uses show that there is an intrinsic link between (Tibetan) egophoricity and performativity.

Against this view, I argue that there is no special performative element to these constructions, but rather that they arise out of two independently attested features of Tibetan egophors: (1) they are not freely useable to indicate just that the evidential origo has personal knowledge of an eventuality, but rather must further identify the origo with one of the thematic roles of the eventuality; and (2) in the absence of thematic roles projected by the verb to identify with the origo (e.g. in the absence of first-person marking), the latter can be interpreted as the causer of the eventuality (cf. the comments in DeLancey 1986: 205-206), as seen in (3)-(4).

(3)
‘Trashi has Pasang’s books.’ […]because I gave them to him.]
[reglossed from Garrett 2001: 185, ex. 96]

(4)
‘This food is delicious.’ […]trust me, I made it.]

(1) and (2) thus get their performative flavor from the fact that the egophoric marking identifies the origo with the causer of the possession of the tea or the name of the child: the speaker must therefore have assigned possession of the tea or named the child.

Tibetan ‘strong ego’ constructions (Garrett 2001: §4.4), which include past perfective and future verb forms, are restrictive in requiring the origo to be identified with one of the arguments to the verb,

1 Performative egophors have also been reported in Wutun (Sandman 2018: 183 ex. 15b), though their wider cross-linguistic prevalence is unknown to me.
and not with a peripheral role like a causer above – they further do not allow for performative readings. I explain this phenomenon in the above terms.

Cross-linguistically, a number of egophoric forms encode more specifically which thematic role the origo is to occupy: agentive egophors appear e.g. in Kathmandu Newari (Hargreaves 2005), and patientive egophors occur e.g. in Awa Pit (Curnow 2002), specifying that the origo must learn of the eventuality by participating as an individual with sufficient proto-agent or proto-patient properties, respectively. In Tibetan, ‘strong’ forms contain egophoric markers like gi yin and byung, which are agentive and patientive, respectively: the origo thus cannot occupy the role of causer, as the grammatical marker requires it to occupy some more restricted suitably agentive or patientive role projected by the verb instead. As a result, apparent performativity in these constructions is ruled out.

I discuss some typological implications for performative egophors in these terms: this is a site of micro-variation, as performatives analogous to (5) are apparently possible in Dege Tibetan (Häsler 2001: 14, ex. 34).

Abbreviations
2 = second-person pronoun; 3 = third-person pronoun; EGO = egophoric; FUT = future; GEN = genitive; IPFV = imperfective; N-EGO = non-egophoric; OBL = oblique; POS = positive degree.

References
Languages spoken in the central region of Papua New Guinea (crossing over 3-4 provincial boundaries) include some of the most complex evidential systems that we are aware of today, and include grammaticalization of meanings to do with personal knowledge or involvement (egophoricity,) and epistemic alignment or ‘engagement’ between speaker and addressee (San Roque & Loughnane 2012; Floyd et al. 2018; Evans et al 2019). Many features of certain New Guinea languages show (sometimes startling) similarities to other languages where evidentiality and related categories have arisen, such as those of the Tran-Himalayan region (e.g., Loughnane 2009). In this talk we look at some of the characteristics that may have conspired to bring these similarities about (Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998, Enfield 2003), as well as identifying areas of difference. We focus on the semantics of direct evidential markers, including the sometimes elusive contrast between visual and non-visual sensory experience, and start to explore the representation of information source in dependent or co-subordinate constructions (with reference to Evans 2007).

References
Interactional functions of evidentials in Wutun:
Implications to the typology of evidentiality and egophoricity

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Wutun is a mixed language spoken by ca. 4000 people in Qinghai Province, Northwest China. While Wutun basic vocabulary and most of its grammatical morphemes are mainly based on the local variety of Northwest Mandarin, its morphosyntax is heavily influenced by the local lingua franca Amdo Tibetan (Chen 1986, Sandman 2016). Wutun has an elaborate Tibetan-type evidential system in which egophoric marker -yek forms a contrast with two evidential markers, sensory-inferential -li and factual re. In addition, all these three markers can be used in a combination with the reported evidential sho. In my earlier work (Sandman 2016, 2018), I have mainly approached the Wutun evidential system from the perspective from high vs. low degree of personal involvement. According to this analysis, the egophoric marker -yek represents high degree of personal involvement and it predominantly occurs when the speaker is the subject or has control over the subject, while sensory-inferential marker -li and factual marker re represent low degree of personal involvement and predominantly occur when the speaker is not the subject. However, in conversational data it is common to find examples of evidential use that are difficult to account (exclusively) in terms on high vs. low degree of speaker involvement. For example, egophoric marker -yek often occurs in contexts where the speaker is not the subject and has no control over the subject. Consider:

1) 01 D: ya da ni qhi
   ok now 2SG go
   02 quandi quan-she-ma
   clothes put_on-RES.AO-COORD
   03 rai~rai-de ze-she
   warm~warm-NMLZ do-RES.AO
   'Ok, you go now. Put some clothes (on her) so it will be warm.'
   04 Z: ya
   ok
   05 D: nanqhan lai-gu-yek
   flu come-COMPL-EGO
   '(Otherwise she) will get a flu.'

Example 1) is uttered in a context in which adults are talking about dressing a child. The egophoric marker in line 05 occurs in a warning, which is uttered as a response to weak agreement ya, ‘ok’ in line 04. The speaker using egophoric marker is not the subject, and has no real control over the subject getting sick; he is rather treating the speaker Z’s response ya, ‘ok’ as too weak agreement to his advice of dressing the child properly, and he is using the egophoric marker to seek more vigorous alignment to his statement from the part of speaker Z.

I suggest that in addition to speaker involvement, epistemic stance (that is, positioning oneself as knowledgeable or ignorant, see Stivers, Mondada & Steensig; Heritage 2012) plays an important role in conditioning evidential marking in Wutun. Speakers use evidentials to negotiate their epistemic rights in conversation and to upgrade or downgrade their statements. In my talk, I will investigate interactional functions of Wutun evidentials in naturally occurring conversational data by using methods from Conversation Analysis (CA) and Interactional Linguistics. In addition, I will discuss the possible implications of these interactional functions to the typology of evidentiality and egophoricity, as well as problems of integrating conversation analytic approach with typological approach in studying evidentials.
References
This study describes and analyzes evidentiality in nDrapa (ISO 639-3 zhb), focusing on egophoricity marking. Previous studies including Shirai (2007) followed a narrow definition of evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004 among others) and excluded egophoricity from the discussion on evidentiality. This study, in contrast, regards egophoricity as a part of evidentiality, based on a broad definition of evidentiality provided by Tournadre & LaPolla (2014).

First, I will survey the evidential system in nDrapa to indicate the position of egophoricity. nDrapa has several sorts of evidentiality including a verbal source of information (reported or direct), nonverbal access to information (inferred, sensory, etc.), and egophoricity. Based on the morphosyntactic positions of evidentiality markers, I will conclude that there are two main types of evidential marking: those marked by verbal suffixes or auxiliaries and those marked by sentence-final particles or a nominalized construction. The former slot is allotted to egophoricity and inner sensation, whereas the latter slot is to hearsay, inference, memory-activation, and factual (Table 1).

Table 1: Slots of evidentiality in nDrapa (revised from Shirai 2021: 107)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of nDrapa evidentiality</th>
<th>Sensory</th>
<th>Inner sensory</th>
<th>Ø (no suffix)</th>
<th>-a / -ɛ</th>
<th>ɦɟi-ɛ</th>
<th>Predicate-final (suffixes/auxiliaries)</th>
<th>Sentence-final (particles/nominals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct access</td>
<td>Self-awareness</td>
<td>Egophoric</td>
<td>ɦɟi-ɛ</td>
<td>-a / -ɛ</td>
<td>ɛrɛ</td>
<td></td>
<td>mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ɦɟi-ɛ</td>
<td>-a / -ɛ</td>
<td>ɛrɛ</td>
<td></td>
<td>pa; nkheɪ̞+ COP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ø (no particle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory activation</td>
<td>Inference</td>
<td></td>
<td>ɦɟi-ɛ</td>
<td>-a / -ɛ</td>
<td>ɛrɛ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ø (no particle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pa; nkheɪ̞+ COP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Source</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td></td>
<td>ɦɟi-ɛ</td>
<td>-a / -ɛ</td>
<td>ɛrɛ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The egophoric is indicated by the lack of a verbal suffix, -a or -ɛ, which is attached to the factual (or non-egophoric) predicate in the perfective or imperfective, respectively. Shirai (2004, 2021) analyzed that the verbal suffixes -a and -ɛ primarily indicate aspect. However, parallel to Zemp’s (2021) discussion, we can analyze that the primary function of both suffixes has been shifted to the factual, while the aspectual value is rather indicated by a verbal prefix. Such verbal prefixes are a set of directional or orientational prefixes, which primarily indicate the direction of motion (upward [UPW], downward [DWN], inward [INW], outward [OUT] and neutral [NTL] directions) but also correlated with the perfective (cf. Shirai 2018).

When analyzed in detail, the two factual suffixes (-a and -ɛ) show different properties. The behavior of the suffix -a is less likely to be restricted by the person of the subject, whereas the suffix -ɛ appears to have stronger person restriction. For example, on one hand, when the speaker is the recipient in a sentence which describes a realized event, the predicate without the factual-perfective suffix -a (i.e., the egophoric form) is used, e.g., (1a), while addition of -a is judged wrong (1b). On the other hand, when the speaker is the recipient in a sentence of an unrealized event, the predicate has the factual-imperfective suffix as in -ɛ as in (2a) while lacking it is judged wrong (2b).

(1) a. ʈaɕɪR anthaH ɲa=ɲɛŋɪL a-ejeR wuF
      PSN just.now 1SG=toward DWN-speak PFT
      ‘Tashi told me a while ago.’
However, predicates in the egophoric form (lacking the factual-imperfective suffix -ɛ) may also be used with third-person actors and unrealized situations. See example (3a). In this case, the speaker puts her daughter’s future action as her family’s plan so she chooses the egophoric form. If the speaker puts it as a third person’s action, she can also choose the non-egophoric form with the suffix -ɛ as in (3b).

These examples suggest that the condition for using the egophoric is the speaker’s involvement, but that dimension of involvement differs between realized and unrealized events. In the case of realized events, the speaker must have experienced the process of the event and perceive it as her/his affair. In the case of unrealized events, the speaker should have been involved in the decision-making process to make the future event realizable.

The critical importance of personal involvement can be seen from the examples of non-volitional sentences. For example, the process of forgetting someone usually happens without notice. Therefore, it is natural to use the factual-perfective suffix -a in (4). In contrast, the speaker experiences the process of losing a game as completely self-involved. Thus, the speaker chooses the egophoric form for their losing a game as in (5) but does choose the factual form for others’ game result as in (6).

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We conclude that the nDrapa egophoric form is marked by the absence of aspectual/factual suffixes -a and -ɛ in the main predicate and that nDrapa egophoric indicates the speaker’s involvement in the process. The critical phases of the event process differ between realized and unrealized events.

**Abbreviations**

DWN – downward directive; FAC – factual; GEN – genitive; IPFV – imperfective; NSUB – non-subject; NTL – neutral directive; PFV – perfective; PFT – perfect; PL – plural; SG – singular.

**References**


Evidentiality in Tawang Monpa, with a focus on the copula system
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The copula system of Tawang Monpa, an East Bodish language spoken in Arunachal Pradesh in India, and in Trashigang in Bhutan, shows a three way evidentiality contrast for the existential copula, and a two way contrast for the equative copula. This system is quite similar to what is described by Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) for Standard Tibetan. In a 2020 article in Languages of the Tibeto Burman Area, *The Copula System of Tawang Monpa*, this system is described in detail, as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existential</th>
<th></th>
<th>Equative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Testimonial</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td><em>nou</em></td>
<td><em>ni</em></td>
<td><em>num</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td><em>monou</em></td>
<td><em>mon</em></td>
<td><em>munum</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existential personal copula *nou* is used both for possession, location and attribution, when what is being spoken of has a clear personal connection to the speaker. In some literature this is described as “egophoric”, which seems like a term that matches the uses of this copula in Tawang Monpa. Some examples are:

1. ɲe=ɕʰe cʰi *nou*  
   1.SG-DAT dog COP.EX.PERS  
   ‘I have a dog.’

2. ɕokpu canɑdɑ *nou*  
   son Canada COP.EX.PERS  
   ‘(My) son is in Canada.’

3. ɲe remba *nou*  
   1.SG good COP.EX.PERS  
   ‘I’m good.’

The existential testimonial copula *ni* is used when the speaker has directly perceived with one of their senses what is being talked about. Below are some examples:

4. ɲok lemin tsokɑ *ni*  
   1.SG.POSS foot dirty COP.EX.TEST  
   ‘My feet are dirty.’

5. india lumpɑ tʰem *ni*  
   India country big COP.EX.TEST  
   ‘India is a big country.’

Example 5 above could be said either by someone who had travelled in India, themselves experienced how large the country is, or by someone looking at a map.

The existential neutral copula is *num*. This copula is used either when the personal nature of knowledge is unimportant, when there has been no direct perception, or when the speaker does not want to reveal how s/he obtained the information conveyed. This is the most common copula, and especially in narrative it is frequently used. A speaker can also choose to use this copula to signal an emotional distance to the topic spoken about. Some examples of this copula follow:

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2 All examples are from Tombleson, 2020.
There were two equative copulas, personal *jin* and neutral *jim*, with the corresponding negative forms *men* and *menum*. The personal equative copula is used in similar circumstances as its existential counterpart and could as well be termed egophoric. The neutral equative copula is used in much the same way as the existential neutral copula *num*. Below are some examples:

8. ŋok meŋ pemɑ jin
   1.SG.POSS name Pema COP.EQ.PERS
   ‘My name is Pema.’

9. be ŋok adz men
   3.SG 1.SG.POSS older brother COP.EQ.PERS
   ‘He is not my older brother.’

10. i=k meŋ sonam jim
    2.SG-POSS name Sonam COP.EQ.NEUT
    ‘Your name is Sonam.’

11. be doctor menum
    3.SG doctor COP.NEG.EQ.NEUT
    ‘He is not a doctor.’

In the other parts of the verb system we see this same three-way distinction in the evidentiality system. There are several verb suffixes ending in *-u* that seem to be egophoric in nature, several suffixes ending in *-um* that seem to be neutral, and one ending in *-dur*, which seems to be testimonial. These endings have not yet been fully analysed, but it is worth mentioning that the three-way distinction found in the copula system is most likely reflected in the verb system overall, although I have not yet been able to identify a full three-way set. Below are examples of three suffixes, in 12 is a progressive egophoric suffix, in 13 a neutral suffix, and in 14 a progressive testimonial suffix.

12. data ŋai topteʰe rot-ja kʰi-čʰe bi-du
    now 1.SG.ERG food bring-CC dog=DAT give=EGO.PROGR
    ‘Now I am bringing food and giving it to the dog.’

13. čʰintar zom tʰi-teʰit raŋ kʰamp nou
    still girl one-TOP only poor EXIST.EGO.COP
    ne-ja sem jør tʰa kʰo-dum
    ‘Still one sister didn’t mind being poor, and she was happy.’

14. data ŋe=čʰe şokpu=si teʰi-dur
    now 1.SG=DAT ant=ERG bite-PROGR.TEST
    ‘Now the ant is biting me.’
References

The epistemic verbal categories “evidentiality” and “egophoricity” play an important role in the verbal systems of many Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayas. In the course of the past decades, our synchronic understanding of these grammatical categories has been considerably enhanced by numerous descriptive studies. However, little is still known about the diachronic processes that give rise to evidentiality and egophoricity. The article addresses this gap by discussing evidence from Bunan, a Tibeto-Burman language for whose past tense system the development of evidentiality and egophoricity can be reconstructed in detail.

In a first part, the development of evidential marking in Bunan will be reconstructed based on language-internal evidence. It will be argued that evidential marking emerged in the past tense domain when a former periphrastic perfect construction developed into a synthetic past tense with an inferential connotation (Widmer 2017b). This innovative inferential past tense then came to stand in opposition to an old past tense, which originally did not express any evidential / epistemic categories, but subsequently acquired a direct evidential construal in consequence of a generalized conversational implicature (cf. Atlas & Levinson 1981). In a second part, the further development of this dichotomic evidential system will be investigated. It will be shown that Bunan reanalyzed a former person distinction as an egophoric opposition (Widmer 2017a; Widmer & Zemp 2017). This diachronic process led to a fundamental restructuring of the past tense domain, which eventually gave rise to the modern Bunan verbal system, which distinguishes between an egophoric past tense, a direct evidential past tense, and an inferential past tense.

The talk will thus offer new insights into the hitherto poorly understood diachronic mechanisms that have given rise to complex epistemic systems in Tibeto-Burman languages of the Greater Himalayan region. At the same time, it provides evidence for egophoricity and evidentiality as closely intertwined yet distinct grammatical categories (Widmer 2017c, 2020).

References:
Integrating egophoricity into evidentiality or rather: Integrating evidentiality into speaker attitude?

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‘Evidentiality’ is often not only about sources or types of knowledge, but also about how a speaker relates him/herself towards this knowledge and its content and how s/he may try to manipulate the addressee’s attitude towards the same, cf. Chernela (2012), DeLancey (2018:593ff.). This speaker attitude, also described as ‘empathy’ (Häsler 2001), plays a prominent role in the Tibetic dialects of Ladakh. Taking up the questions of the workshop call,

i. X (privileged access: yin ‘be’, yod ‘exist’) can be defined against: Y, Z, and a fuzzy set of inferential, epistemic, and discourse-pragmatic hedging markers.

ii. Unlike person categories, X vs. Y/Z reflect the origo’s perspective, implying a perspective flip in information-seeking questions – answers, however, can be formulated independently according to one’s own stance, (1).

iii. Y (ḥdug) and Z (rag), commonly classified as markers of visual and non-visual perception (note: Z can not be applied when (part of) the situation is also visually perceived), (2), may also express inferences, (3)-(5). Data from a blind speaker, (2b), (6), and indiosyncratic use of Y for non-visual perceptions, (7), indicate that the opposition is between more immediate/ intense and less immediate/ intense input, (9).

iv. X is frequently based on sensory perceptions, provided that these perceptions are of great number, (8), whereas Y and Z signal a limited number of perceptions. X-Z thus connotate different grades of acquaintance, cf. (9).

v. Generally, X occurs when the situation belongs to one’s personal sphere, when one is actively involved in, is responsible for, has the pragmatic authority to represent as personal, the communicated situation, (10), or takes an (indignated) authoritative stance, (11)-(12).

vi. Not just exceptionally, X does not occur when one does not have the authority to represent a situation as personal, as with shared or shareable knowledge; further when one lacks responsibility, (13), and when one rejects any closer identification even for situations in one’s personal sphere, (14)-(15).

vii. Contrastive (‘comparative’) constructions focus on one’s attitude towards the contrastee, hence inversion can lead to a different marker, although the knowledge types concerning the two members remain exactly the same (16).

viii. Reduced forms of Y became markers of epistemic modality (Zeisler 2017).

ix. The opposition between X and Y developed on the base of their temporal values: generally applicable (yod ‘exist’) vs. limited duration (ḥdug ‘stay’) > unrestricted truth (yod) vs. limited validity (ḥdug). These values were inherited by the auxiliaries for present tense/ imperfect and perfect constructions, leading to a proto-evidential system (Zeisler 2018). I thus disagree with Zemp (2017), who sees the evolution of the contrast only in the perfect construction.

x. Aspect is not a valid category for Tibetic languages. Past and future tense constructions developed similar oppositions much later, with lesser distinctions and a greater residue of neutral applications. Future tense, by definition, lacks the category of sensory perception, Ladakhi past tense lacks the opposition visual vs. non-visual.

Because in Ladakhi, the origo’s perspective and the socio-pragmatic restrictions are overarching principles, speaker attitude cannot be integrated into ‘evidentiality’. It is not a question of whether one has privileged access, but whether one has the authority to present the situation as personal knowledge. The semantic space of speaker attitude is divided into a part where one assumes personal authority, and another part where one cannot do so. The latter is divided into fields of evidentiality, epistemic modality, and socio-pragmatic values. Cf. Widmer (2020) for a similar layered structure.
a. Repeated personal experience, Leh bazaar


BZ: ‘Do you have butter? <X: I expect you to know, I take you to be responsible.>’ – Shopkeeper: ‘Yes, there is. <Y: But why do you call upon my responsibility?>’

b. Repeated personal experience, same shop, same shopkeeper


BZ: ‘Do you by chance have butter? <Y: I'm just asking, not claiming your responsibility>’ – Shopkeeper: ‘Yes, of course we have butter. <X: No need to be shy. I know well, it’s my shop after all.>’ – da capo al infinito … – Not a matter of looking or not looking!

(1) Domkharpa (FD 2012)

bila- s mane ton-en-(n)uk. / ton-en-(n)ak.

cat-erg mane utter-cont-Y =PRS utter-cont-Z =PRS

‘The cat is murmuring mane [prayers] = is purring (Y: as I see: the cat is in view / Z: as I hear: the cat is out of view).’ – note: Z cannot be applied if there is also visual input.

b. Sharapa (FD 2016)

tgksa piľa mgne ton-duk. / tön-a-rak.

now cat prayer utter-Y =PRS utter-NLS -Z =PRS

‘The cat is purring now.’ (According to the blind speaker, Y: “The cat is close enough that I can feel or touch her.” / Z: The cat is behind, out of reach, or even outside the room.)

(2) Tagmacikpa (FD 2019)

deriŋ ēāŋmo ḍak. / duk.

today cold be(Z) be(Y)

‘Today I feel cold [independent of the weather]. / Today it is cold (I can see the clouds).’ (With respect to the second alternative, the informant comments that without the clouds one would not be able to see that it is cold. Whereas when one sees the sun, it is clear that it is warm outside. In both cases, the temperature is merely inferred, based on visual input.)

Shachukulpa (FD 2016)

ʈūu ʈaŋmu duk. ĭa zer-na, kho _ “da-ruk.

child cold be(Y) why say-CD s/he tremble-Y =PRS

‘The child is/ has cold. That is, s/he is shivering.’ (The speaker can only infer that the child has cold, upon observing his/her behaviour or looks.)

(3) Ciktanpa (FD 2017)

di-a armi kem-pįk ḍak.

this-all army camp-LQ exist(Z)

‘Here is an army camp (as I can hear [the dogs]).’ (In Ciktan, people do not hold dogs, but dogs are fed at army camps, so upon hearing the dogs, one can infer that there is a camp.)

(4) Kharnakpa (FD 2018)

ŋa˖(ː) ʨānda- naŋ pēni ḍu’. / ťa?

I-PPOS -pocket-poss money have(Y) have(Z)

‘I have [some] money in my pocket (Y: touching the money when groping inside the pocket without looking, which is a bit more sure than / Z: only feeling from outside).’

(5) a. Sharapa (2016, the blind speaker talking about climbing the Stok glacier)

tge bat mŋpọ hoŋ-duk.

then rockslide many come-Y =PRS

‘Then many [little] rockslides were coming down.’ (As the speaker explained: hearing them, feeling them, that is, being hit, “they came towards me, in front of me”).

b. Sharapa (2016, the blind speaker talking about climbing the Stok glacier)

ʈhet mŋpọ rak.

slope many exist(Z)

‘There were a lot of [steep] slopes.’ (Less directly experienced through the speaker’s climbing [not coming towards her]).

(6) Kharnakpa (FD 2018)

ŋa˖(ː) ʨānda-naŋ pēni ḍu’. / ťa?

I-PPOS -pocket-poss money have(Y) have(Z)

‘I have [some] money in my pocket (Y: touching the money when groping inside the pocket without looking, which is a bit more sure than / Z: only feeling from outside).’
(8) Khardongpa (FD 2016)

Tiri village-ALL grandfather old-LQ exist(X)
‘There is an old grandfather in the Tiri village [far away from Khardong].’ (The informant comments: “I am not a Tiripa, but I go there quite often.”)

(9) Construct Mai 2021, based on data from speakers of various dialects and own experience

su-ag met. / mī-nuk. / mī-rak.
who-FM NG-exist(X) NG-exist(Y) NG-exist(Z)
‘Nobody is here/there.’ (X: I know from beforehand, as I am involved, or I have observed many times. / Y: I have looked everywhere. / Z: I called and didn’t get any response.)

(10) Gya-Mīrupa (FD 2013)

pgaln-a pëtse hot.
cow-AES calf have(X)
‘The cow is with a calf.’ (The cow is the origo’s, who already knows or is responsible.)

(11) Shachukulpa (FD 2016)

aṭi pēra lā-at, ṇa-(::) tsōlosa pāploŋ ma-hōn!!
elder.sister speech give-X=PRS I-AES anus.place put.down.time NG-come
‘[Right now,] the elder sister is [calmly] talking [on her phone], and I [even] have no time to shit!!’ (Working together on the fields, but one person shuns the work.)

(12) Lingshetpa (FD 2016)

kher de ḷhī! ḷhugu ḷjiks-ek, / ḷjiks-et, thọнная-ma-thọнная?!
take.way.IMP that dog child be.afraid-Y=PRS be.afraid-X=PRS see-NG-see
‘Take that dog away! Don’t you see (lit. You did not see at all) that the child is afraid?!’ ((Could be said about an unrelated child, seen crying; Y would be used neutrally,) assuming authority with X makes it more urgent.)

a. Lingshetpa (FD 2016)

skara gonpa-(::) guru rimpoʧhe-(::) sku *(ȝaŋ-se)-dук.
Skara monastery-ALL Guru Rimpoche-GEN hon.statue hon.erect-CV-Y=PERF
‘In the Skara monastery, is a statue of Guru Rimpoche (Padma Sambhava).’ (The speaker, [who does not feel related to the monastery, as he is from a different, far-off village], was not involved in setting up the statue.)

b. Lingshetpa (FD 2016)

skara gonpa-(::) kargjut setʰiŋ *(ȝaŋ-se)-jot.
Skara monastery-ALL Bkaḥ.brgyud lineage hon.erect-CV-X=PERF
‘In the Skara monastery, is the Bkaḥ.brgyud lineage.’ (The speaker was involved as painter.)

Pragmatics of politeness generally make a perfect construction with a honorific full verb preferable to the plain existential, even when simply talking just about what is there in the monastery; some speakers, like this one, would not use the plain existential, at all.

(14) Ciktanpa (FD 2017)

mamani-tsana jula-s zan maŋmo khjọn-ma-t.
mamani-when villager-ERG food much bring-NLS-X=HAB
dutsek zan khjọn-en-duk ki mi-sak ḷaŋ-se,
this.much food bring-CNT-Y=PRS that people-PL be.full-CV
ʈorobaln-yag-a ṭaŋ-ma-rgos-en-duk,
cattle.cow-PL-ALL give-NLS-need-CNT-Y=PRS
dāŋ ki zan qamti [=qimati] in.
when that food precious be(X)
mamani-tsana rgo-s-p-i zan-ʧi fi(ʈ)-na, ŭhik duk.
mamani-when need-NLS-GEN food-LQ take.out-CD ok be(Y)
‘At the mamani festival, people use to bring a lot of food. [But] they bring so much food that everybody is full, and one has to give [the rest] to the cattle, even though the food is precious. It would be better, if [one] takes out [as only as much] food as needed (lit. if [one] takes ..., it is ok) at the mamani festival.’ [X is used neutrally for a well-known habit. / Y is used for a critical or distanced view of the habit. Here the speaker opposes the fact that so much precious food is
thrown away. In the second part, X is used for an objective fact (food IS precious),] <while Y indicates a more subjective evaluation and wish.>

(15) Gya-Mirupa (FD 2008)

\[ \begin{align*}
& \text{khi khor-zane, am-e tāŋse ng si-huk.} \\
& \text{threshing turn-when mother-ERG always barley winnow-Y=PRS}
\end{align*} \]

‘During threshing, [our] mother always winnows the barley.’ (A situation, quite familiar to the informant. But the speaker no longer does this work and also does not want to do it.)

(16) Tagmacigpa (FD 2019)

\[ \begin{align*}
& \text{domkhar-i gonpa-basaŋ tagma饬ig-i gonpa ṭin-ŋa in.} \\
& \text{Domkhar-GEN monastery-CNTR Tagmacik-GEN monastery be.old-NLS be(X)} \\
& \text{tagma饬ig-i gonpa-basaŋ domkhar-i gonpa soma intsok.} \\
& \text{Tagmacik-GEN monastery-CNTR Domkhar-GEN monastery new be(GEM~factual)}
\end{align*} \]

‘The monastery of Tagmacik [that is, ours] is older than the monastery of Domkhar. The monastery of Domkhar [that is, theirs] is newer than the monastery of Tagmacik.’

The generalised evaluative marker (GEM) has many functions; here, it indicates that the speaker has certain (and shared) knowledge (Domkhar is just on the other side of the river; people of both villages have mutual relationships), but does not belong there, whereas the copula emphasises her belonging and identification.

Abbreviations

“\(=\)”: ‘equals’ (not a clitic marker!) AES: aesthetive (experiencer subject); ALL: allative; CD: conditional; CNT: continuative (obligatory in non-origo present/ imperfect tenses in Western Sham and Purik, thus leading to neutral present/imperfect tenses); CNTR: contrast; CV: converb marker; ERG: ergative; FM: focus marker; GEM: generalised evaluative marker; GEN: genitive; HAB: habitual; hon: honorific; IMP: imperative; LQ: limiting quantifier (‘a’, ‘some’); NG: negation; NLS: nominaliser; PA: past (stem); PERF: perfect; PL: plural; PPOS: postposition; PRS: present (stem); QM: question marker; TOP: topic marker. Angled brackets with italics indicate my interpretation – which is based on discussions with informants and logical reasoning, but not confirmed by the respective speaker. Square brackets and no italics are used for explanations given by the respective informant with other, similar examples.

References


Main point. Some evidentials can have subevent scope—marking evidence specifically for a temporal part of the whole event. Lhasa Tibetan -byung is best analyzed as encoding subevent-level egophoric evidence. This analysis captures two pragmatic effects of -byung, and yields a more transparent division of the V-EVID forms (V-byung/-bzhag/-'dug vs. V-yod/-song) in the evidential-aspectual paradigm of Lhasa Tibetan.

Background. 1. Canonical definitions of evidentiality (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004, Willet 1988) often assume that evidentials mark that the speaker has a certain type of evidence for the entire event being described. 2. Previous works agree that -byung is egophoric in terms of evidence type, but disagree on how best to characterize -byung’s apparent thematic restriction and aspectual value. Two directions have been taken: one appeals to a metaphorical notion of an event as being oriented towards the speaker (“receptive egophoric past-tense” [Tournadre & Sangda Dorje 2003, Vokurková 2008], “cislocative perfective” [Oisel 2017]); the other specifies a role or scope restriction (“perfective, speaker as Goal/Experiencer” [DeLancey 2003], “VP-level ego” [Garrett 2001]). However, in every case, such characterizations are both notionally and paradigmatically ad-hoc, and it is unclear how “speaker orientation” and role/scope restrictions are to be unified.

Proposal. I adopt a well-established decompositional analysis of events (Dowty 1979 et seq.) in terms of two subevent primitives. A CAUSE subevent encompasses the Agent’s active involvement, from the onset of the intention (if a volitional/+control event), to the Agent’s action to bring about the event up to its endpoint. A BECOME subevent encompasses the Patient/Undergoer’s transition from its pre-event original state up to the result-state, which obtains at the culmination point. Thus, for example, an intransitive inchoative event consists of a single BECOME subevent (with 0 or positive in-event duration), whereas a transitive accomplishment event consists of a CAUSE subevent by the Agent (with positive in-event duration), plus a logically and temporally linked BECOME subevent on the Patient (with 0 or positive in-event duration, depending on whether the nature of the effect on the Patient occurs gradually or punctually).

Crucially: an evidential may convey that the speaker has x type of evidence just over part of this temporal structure. Specifically, in the case of -byung: it encodes that the speaker has egophoric evidence about the BECOME subevent.

Explaining pragmatic effects. (i) -byung can appear with a first-person Agent (1), but with an obligatory mirative and/or remorseful interpretation. This follows straightforwardly from the subevent-evidential analysis: in asserting a transitive event but marking only egophoric evidence on BECOME, the speaker indicates that s/he has a different, and non-immediate (thus delayed), type of evidence for the CAUSE subevent, hence the mirative/remorseful effect.

(1) nga.rang=gis nga na-pa bzos-byung
I.myself=ERG I be.ill-NM make-BYUNG
‘I had made myself sick (it turns out! What a shame.).’ (Own fieldwork)

(ii) Negation of -byung can sometimes implicate that the speaker unsuccessfully tried to do something (2). This is a Maxim of Quantity-based conversational implicature that also follows directly from the above analysis: in contexts where a logically related (even if not lexically encoded) CAUSE subevent is salient, the speaker can implicate, by negating only the BECOME subevent on egophoric evidence, that the CAUSE counterpart is true.

(2) nga dran ma-byung.
I remember NEG-BYUNG
‘I didn’t remember (implicated: though I tried).’ (Denwood 1999:145, emphasis mine)
Paradigmatic extension. V-\textit{byung} belongs to the part of the Lhasa Tibetan evidential-aspectual paradigm that takes the morphological form V-EVID (where EVID=\textit{-yod}, \textit{-byung}, \textit{-song}, \textit{-'dug}, \textit{-bzhag}). Subevent-scope evidentiality yields a clearer division of this part of the paradigm: V-\textit{byung} and V-\textit{bzhag}/-\textit{'dug} encode, respectively, egophoric and direct evidence over just the BECOME subevent, while V-\textit{yod} and V-\textit{song} encode, respectively, egophoric and direct evidence over the entire event. I discuss potential connections and divergences between this synchronic picture and the diachronic development of Lhasa verb roots from the erstwhile perfective stems of Old/Classical Tibetan.

References