Call for Papers ‘Evidentiality 2.0: Integrating egophoricity, focusing on equipollent contrasts, and re-examining visual evidentials’

Following Willet (1988) and Aikhenvald (2004, 2018), most accounts of evidentiality systems throughout the world exclude markers which are “used when the speaker was the agent of the action reported” because “the source of evidence does not seem to be their primary meaning” (Willet 1988: 91). While these markers may not seem to indicate the source of evidence, they may still correspond to what Willet (1988: 55) identifies as the common thread in all previously expressed views on evidentiality, to wit, that evidentiality is “the linguistic means of indicating how the speaker obtained the information on which s/he bases an assertion.” Accordingly, Willet’s exclusion of markers occurring with speaker subjects may have been unjustified, and we suggest re-including them, which would essentially correspond to analyzing markers commonly called “egophoric” as evidentials (Tournadre 1991; Floyd et al. 2018).

Egophoric markers form equipollent contrasts with other evidentials in languages from all regions for which grammaticalized evidentiality has been described: the Greater Himalayan Region (GHR, see below), the New Guinea Highlands (San Roque & Loughnane 2012), the Caucasus (Creissels 2008), and the Americas (e.g., for Tucanoan languages, see Barnes 1984, Stenzel 2008; Barbacoan: Dickinson 2000, Curnow 2002; and Pomoan: Oswalt 1986, McLendon 2003). As contrasting evidentials appear to be defined against each other at least in the GHR, we argue that the inclusion of egophoric markers is crucial for an adequate account of such evidential contrasts. In the following, we sketch a tentative typology of evidential contrasts based on those we find in GHR languages – the goal of the workshop is to discuss and develop this typology by taking into consideration evidentiality systems from all regions of the world.

In languages of the GHR, we can distinguish the following types of equipollent evidential contrasts (where contrasting evidentials share an inherent tense/aspect-value):

1. Direct vs. indirect: There are two subtypes of direct evidentials contrasting with indirect evidentials indicating that a past event was not directly witnessed by the speaker (but is inferred from circumstantial evidence or was reported). First, direct evidentials found in Tibetic varieties spoken in Amdo (Sun 1993), Kham (Häsler 1999), and Northern Nepal (Volkart 2000), which derive from finite verb forms meaning ‘went, went past’, indicate that a past event was directly observed by the speaker. Second, Middle Mongol \textit{v-IUGA}, of unclear origin (cf. Bese 1970: 30–4, Brosig & Skribnik 2018: 559), indicates that a past event was directly witnessed by the speaker, but is also used when the speaker performed the event (Street 2009; Brosig 2014).

2. Factual vs. immediate: In the common ancestor of most non-eastern Tibetic varieties, yod, originally the only (evidentially neutral) existential copula, in perfect constructions became contrasted with ‘dug, which originally meant ‘stayed, was there’. While ‘dug came to indicate that the state resulting from a past event was recently witnessed by the speaker (“immediate”), yod came to mean that the speaker does not depend on recent evidence to know that the state holds true (“factual”; for details, see Zemp 2017).

3. High vs. low degree of personal involvement: In the Tibetic variety spoken in Southern Mustang, the previously evidentially neutral equational copula \textit{yin} contrasts with \textit{rag}, which originally meant ‘was felt’. While this \textit{rag came to imply that an identity is inferred from immediate sensory evidence}, \textit{yin came to imply personal involvement on the part of the speaker (Kretschmar 1995; Bielmeier 2000; Zemp 2017, 2020). Note that this meaning does not preclude \textit{yin} from being used, even if very rarely, in statements in which someone other than the speaker is the subject, namely when the speaker exerts control over this person (as described by Häsler [2001: 14] for Dege-Kham).
4. Internal (conjunct) vs. external (disjunct): The distinction between “conjunct/disjunct” (Hale 1971, 1980) or “internal/external” (Bendix 1992) was first established for two past tenses in Kathmandu Newar. The conjunct/internal marker only occurs in main-clause statements when the speaker is the subject. While the disjunct/external marker occurs in (main-clause) statements whenever someone else is the subject, it may also be used when the speaker is the subject to imply that s/he lacks the privileged access (Hargreaves 2005) one would expect from a subject, which typically means that s/he did not intend or have control over the event. Other Himalayan languages with similar oppositions include Kaire (Watters 2006), Dolakhae (Genetti 2007) and Bunan (Widmer 2015).

The inclusion of egophoric s as evidentials allows us to recognize several different types of such evidentials, none of which directly encode that the speaker is the subject in the event profiled in a statement, but which interact with this parameter in different ways. For instance, whereas both ‘factual’ and ‘high personal involvement’ (but not ‘internal’) markers may also occur when the speaker is not the subject, ‘external’ (but not ‘immediate’ and ‘low personal involvement’) markers may also occur when the speaker is the subject (see Zemp 2020).

Another advantage of including egophoric evidentials is the following: What has been viewed as a characteristic of egophoric markers and conjunct-disjunct oppositions (Floyd et al. 2018: 2–6), namely that these markers anticipate the perspective of the addressee in a question, is argued by Zemp (2020: 31–2) to characterize all equipollent evidential contrasts found in the GHR, and follows from what these evidentials do. Because they indicate how the information conveyed in a sentence was obtained, they always reflect the perspective of the ‘informant’ (Bickel 2008), which is the speaker in a statement, the addressee in a question, and the source in a reported speech clause. San Roque et al. (2017) show that this also applies to evidentials in other parts of the world.

We invite scholars to (re-)investigate evidential systems from all around the world and to clarify the meaning and role of each evidential (X) within these systems by seeking answers to questions such as the following:

- Is X defined against another (or even more than one) evidential?
- Does X have an inherent tense/aspect-value? If so, does it share this value with a contrasting construction (Y)? Is there any evidence that X and Y may have originally had different tense/aspect-values?
- If X occurs in questions and/or in reported speech, whose perspective does it reflect there?
- Does X predominantly occur when the informant is the subject, and exceptionally when s/he is not? Or does X predominantly occur when the informant is not the subject, and exceptionally when s/he is? Under what circumstances do these uses arise?
- Does X have cognates? If so, is it possible to diachronically account for how it may have developed?

We invite scholars also to re-investigate constructions previously analyzed as ‘visual evidentials’, as this label may not always be justified. Many alleged ‘visual evidentials’ occur in statements in which the speaker is the subject (for Amazonian languages, see Barnes 1984: 259; Malone 1988: 127–8; Miller 1999: 65; Aikhenvald 2003: 293; Stenzel 2008: 412), but according to none of these authors do the constructions in question convey that the speaker looks at her/his own action from an outside perspective (which we would expect from visual evidentials). Some alleged ‘visual evidentials’ appear to be formally unmarked in terms of
evidentiality (Kaye 1970: 28, 32, 34; Malone 1988: 127–8; Aikhenvald 2003: 293; Epps 2005: 622–4). From our Himalayan background, we would expect such formally unmarked constructions to be evidentially neutral.

References:


